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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
On April 27, 2007, the South Jordan City Employee Appeals Board ("Appeals
Board") conducted a hearing on petitioner Daniel Pearson's ("Mr. Pearson") grievance of
South Jordan City's ("South Jordan" or the "City") determination that Mr. Pearson's job
as Assistant Police Chief was "at-will."1 The Appeals Board issued a decision on April
30, 2007, finding that Mr. Pearson was an at-will employee. R. 21. On May 10, 2007,
Mr. Pearson filed a Petition for Review ("Petition") of the Appeals Board's decision in
the Court of Appeals. R. 22-23. The Petition states the basis for jurisdiction as "Rule 14
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 4-08(4)(c) of the South Jordan City
Employees Policy." Id,
Respondent South Jordan's position is that this Court has no subject matter
jurisdiction over the substance of the appeal by Mr. Pearson, although it does have
jurisdiction to determine its own subject matter jurisdiction,.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Issue: Does this Court have subject matter jurisdiction over an appeal of a

grievance by Mr. Pearson, the City's Assistant Police Chief, of the Appeals Board's
determination that his position was at-will?

*Mr. Pearson's appeal to the Appeals Board also sought review as to whether Stage
Three of his grievance was timely filed. That issue plays no part in the instant appeal.
1

Standard of Review: "Subject matter jurisdiction is the power and
authority of the court to determine a controversy and without which it cannot proceed."
Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). "The fundamental and
initial inquiry of a court is always to determine its own jurisdictional authority over the
subject matter of the claims asserted. Upon a determination by the Court that its
jurisdiction is lacking, the authority extends no further than to dismiss the action." Id.
The burden to establish subject matter jurisdiction rests on the party asserting that it
exists. Id. at 1232 n.2.
2.

Issue: Should any decision that Mr. Pearson was an at-will employee under

Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 be summarily affirmed due to his failure to marshal the
evidence on appeal?
Standard of Review: "'Even where [appellants] purport to challenge only
the legal ruling, . . . if a determination of a court's application of a legal standard is
extremely fact-sensitive, the [appellants] have a duty to marshal the evidence.'" United
Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain, 2006 UT 33, f 25, 140 P.3d 1200
(quoting Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f 20, 100 P.3d 1177); see also Traco Steel
Erectors, Inc. v. Control, Inc., 2007 UT App 407, \ 44, 175 P.3d 572 (noting contractual
provisions are fact-sensitive because they involve contract language and factual situations
about change orders). A party "cannot dodge this duty by attempting to frame the issues
as legal ones." Stichting, 2006 UT 33, f 25, 140 P.3d 1200.

2

"A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that
supports the challenged finding." Utah R.App.P. 24(a)(9); Whitear v. Labor Comm'n,
973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). "If an appellant fails to marshal evidence, the
appellate court will not address a challenge to factual findings and must assume they are
correct." Id. at 985; see also Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998).
3.

Issue: With regard to Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105, did the Appeals Board

err in finding that Mr. Pearson's position as Assistant Police Chief was at-will?
Standard of Review: A '"Board's application or interpretation of a statute
is a question of law,'" and is reviewed under the correction of error standard. Whitaker v.
Utah State Retirement Bd., 2008 UT App 282, f 10, 191 P.3d 814 (citation omitted).
When construing a statute, courts "do '"not look beyond the plain language of [the]
provision'"" unless it '""find[s] some ambiguity in it.'"" Utah Pub. Employees Assyn v.
State of Utah, 2006 UT 9, f 59, 131 P.3d 208 (citations omitted) (Parrish, J., concurring).
When ambiguity is found, a court looks at "legislative history and relevant policy
considerations." Id. "Like a contract, a statute is ambiguous when it may reasonably 'be
understood to have two or more plausible meanings.'" Id. at f 60 (citations omitted). In
situations of ambiguity, the court may look at facts provided by the parties, and apply
those to make a decision. Wilson Supply Co. v Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, fft 13-19,
54P.3dll77.

3

4.

Issue: With regard to Mr. Pearson's contention that he had an express or

implied-in-fact employment agreement that he was not an at-will employee, should this
Court summarily affirm the Appeals Board's decision based on Mr. Pearson's failure to
marshal the evidence?
Standard of Review: Whether an express contract exists is a question of fact
which must be determined by the fact finder. Hellstrom v. Osguthorpe, 455 P.2d 28, 442
(Utah 1969). Whether an implied-in-fact employment agreement exists to take an
employee out of the at-will category is a question of fact. Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores,
Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 401 (Utah 1998); Gilmore v. Salt Lake City Community Action
Program, 775 P.2d 940, 941 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
"A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that
supports the challenged finding." Utah R.App.P. 24(a)(9); Whitear, 973 P.2d at 984.
"'Even where [appellants] purport to challenge only the legal ruling,... if a
determination of a court's application of a legal standard is extremely fact-sensitive, the
[appellants] have a duty to marshal the evidence.'" Stichting, 2006 UT 33, f 25, 140 P.3d
1200 (citation omitted); see also Traco, 2007 UT App 407, f 44, 175 P.3d 572
(contractual provisions are fact-sensitive when they involve contract's language). If an
appellant fails to marshal evidence in his initial brief, the court will assume factual
findings are correct. Whitear, 973 P.2d at 985; see also Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 312.
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5.

Issue: Did Mr. Pearson have an express agreement with the City that his

employment was not at-will?
Standard of Review: Whether an express contract exists is a question of
fact to be determined by the fact finder. Hellstrom, 455 P.2d at 442. With regard to
factual issues, on appeal, an Appeals Board's findings "must be supported by substantial
evidence viewed in light of the whole record," and "[substantial evidence 'is that
quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind
to support a conclusion.5" Lucas v. Murray Civil Serv. Cornm'n, 949 P.2d 746, 758 (Utah
Ct. App. 1997) (citations omitted). The appellate court does not "'review the
Commission's findings de novo or reweigh the evidence,'" and "'defer[s] to the
Commission's findings on credibility.'" Huemiller v. Ogden Civil Serv. Comm'n, 2004
UT App 375, <j[ 2, 101 P.3d 394 (citation omitted). The appellate court "employs a clearly
erroneous standard in assessing whether to overturn a Commission's factual findings."
Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv. Comm'n, 2000 UT App 235, \ 15, 8 P.3d 1048.
6.

Issue: Did Mr. Pearson have an implied-in-fact agreement with the City that

his position as Assistant Police Chief was not at-will?
Standard of Review: Whether an implied-in-fact employment agreement
exists to take an employee out of the at-will category is a question of fact. Ryan, 972 P.2d
at 401; Gilmore, 775 P.2d at 941. The existence of an implied-in-fact employment
agreement "turns on the objective manifestations of the parties' intent." Johnson v.

5

Kimberly Clark Worldwide, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1121 (D. Utah 2000). With regard
to factual issues, the Appeals Board's findings "must be supported by substantial
evidence viewed in light of the whole record," and "[substantial evidence "'is that
quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind
to support a conclusion.'"" Lucas, 949 P.2d at 758 (citations omitted). The appellate
court does not "'review the Commission's findings de novo or reweigh the evidence,'"
and '"defer[s] to the Commission's findings on credibility.'" Huemiller, 2004 UT App
375, f 2, 101 P.3d 394 (citation omitted). The appellate court "employs a clearly
erroneous standard in assessing whether to overturn a Commission's factual findings."
Kelly, 2000 UT App 235, f 15, 8 P.3d 1048.
STATUTES AND RULES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE
Copies of statutes and rules of central importance to this appeal are attached as
Exhibit A in the Addendum to this Brief ("SJC Addendum").
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND
DISPOSITION BELOW.
This is an appeal by Daniel Pearson ("Mr. Pearson") former South Jordan

Assistant Police Chief, of the Appeals Board's determination that his position as Assistant
Police Chief was at-will. Mr. Pearson was hired by South Jordan in July 2002. R. 155.
At the time he was hired by South Jordan, he was Midvale City's Assistant Police Chief.
R. 46. He was terminated as South Jordan's Assistant Police Chief on January 30, 2007.
6

R. 1. The letter given to Mr. Pearson by City Manager Rick Horst at the time of his
termination states that his position as Assistant Police Chief is at-will. Id.
On January 31, 2007, Mr. Pearson faxed a letter to the City titled "Notice of Intent
to Appeal Termination." See R. 2-3. City Manager Rick Horst responded to this letter on
February 8, 2007, informing Mr. Pearson that his letter had been received and that the
appeals procedure in the City's Employee Handbook did not apply to him because his
position as Assistant Police Chief was at-will. R. 4.
On February 8, 2007, Mr. Pearson sent the City another letter titled "Notice of
Appeal, Grievance, and Legal Representation," which stated that it was an appeal of his
termination and that, if an appeal of his termination was refused, the letter was to be
considered as giving notice of his intent to grieve his termination under the City's
grievance procedure. R. 5.
On or about March 6, 2007, Mr. Pearson's attorney sent a letter to City employee
John Geilmann in which he detailed the "grievance time line" process that Mr. Pearson
had been following. See R. 7-11. The time line in the letter noted that Mr. Pearson was
at Step Three of his grievance pursuant to § 4-07(2)(e) of the City's Employee Handbook.
See R. 7-8. On or about March 19, 2007, the City sent a letter to Mr. Pearson and his
attorney stating that his Step Three grievance had not been timely filed, and concluding
that his termination was upheld. R. 12-13.

7

On March 19, 2007, Mr. Pearson's attorney sent a letter to the Appeals Board,
which the attorney stated was submitted pursuant to Step Five of the grievance process.
R. 14-20. That letter disputed the City's decision that the Step Three grievance had been
untimely (R. 16-18), and continued to grieve the at-will determination by the City (R. 1820). Continuing with the grievance, the letter stated that Mr. Pearson's position was: (1)
that his title/position was "assistant police chief," and not "deputy police chief," and that
he was at-will under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 only if his title/position was a "deputy
police chief (R. 18); (2) that the letter given to him by Shelly Chapman at his hiring in
July 2002 gave him reason to believe that he was not at-will (R. 18-19); and (3) that
unspecified verbal statements led him to believe he was not at will, and that Police Chief
Lindsay Shepherd had made no comments when Mr. Pearson had told him he did not
want an at-will position (R. 19-20).
The Appeals Board agreed to hear Mr. Pearson's grievance only as to the at-will
issue. At the hearing on that appeal, Mr. Pearson testified on his own behalf and was
allowed to call witnesses and be represented by counsel. See R. 26-27. After hearing the
testimony and reviewing the documents presented, the Appeals Board determined that
Mr. Pearson was an at-will employee. See R. 21 (Appeals Bd. Decision).
On May 10, 2007, Mr. Pearson filed a Petition for Review ("Petition") in the Utah
Court of Appeals seeking review of the Appeals Board's decision. See R. 22-23. The
Petition gives the basis for appeal as Utah R.Civ.P. 14 and Rule 4-08(4)(c) of the

8

Employee Handbook, and asks this Court to review the Appeals Board's "decision that
[Mr. Pearson] was an at-will employee at the time of his termination from the position of
South Jordan City Assistant Police Chief." Id.
On September 10, 2007, the Court of Appeals issued an Order on its own motion
to transfer the appeal. See R. 24-25. The Order states that pursuant to Utah R.App.P. 44,
the Court of Appeals does not have appellate jurisdiction. Id. The Court of Appeals
transferred the Petition to the Utah Third District Court in West Jordan, citing Utah Code
Ann. § 78-3-4(7) as the basis for district court jurisdiction. Id; see also R. 27
(Remittitur).
On December 14, 2007, the City filed a Motion for Summary Disposition of
Appeal in the district court, asking the district court to dismiss Mr. Pearson's appeal on
grounds that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal.
See City's Petition to Supreme Court for Interlocutory Appeal. The district court denied
the Motion for Summary Disposition and declined to decide whether it had subject matter
jurisdiction over the appeal. Id. Instead, the district court ordered the parties to submit
memoranda stating their respective positions on how the district court should proceed
with the appeal. See id.
After the district court declined to decide whether it had subject matter jurisdiction
over Mr. Pearson's appeal, the City filed a Petition for Interlocutory Appeal on grounds
that a district court cannot decline to rule on its own subject matter jurisdiction. See id.
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Upon receipt of the Petition for Interlocutory Appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside its
Order transferring Mr. Pearson's appeal to the district court, and reinstated his original
appeal to the Court of Appeals. R. 30-35. Briefing in this Court then began.
II.

RESPONSE TO MR. PEARSON'S STATEMENT OF FACTS.2
The City disputes Mr. Pearson's Statement of Facts as follows:
1.

In Part A of his Statement of Facts, Mr. Pearson contends he was told when

hired that Assistant Police Chief was a position where he could only be terminated for
cause. Pet'r Init. Br., p. 2. However, the pages from the Appeals Board hearing
transcript that he cites to support this statement reflect that he testified to the Appeals
Board only about his own "understanding," and his own expectations and interpretations.
See id.; see also R. 47-49, 66 (Transcript of Hrg. ("Tr."), pp. 12-14, 33).
2.

In Part A of his Statement of Facts, Mr. Pearson cites a July 15, 2002 letter

from Shelly Chapman of the City's Human Resources office, and contends this is a
contract which takes him out of the at-will category. See Pet'r Init. Br., p. 2. However,
that letter is not an express statement that Mr. Pearson's position as Assistant Police Chief
will not be at-will. It also ignores that in 2002, the statute that Mr. Pearson cites to
support his argument that he is not at-will when hired, did not apply to any members of
the police department. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 (2002 version) (excluding police

2

Mr. Pearson's unnumbered Facts will be handled issue by issue.
10

department members from § 10-3-1106 due process requirements), attached as Ex. B in
SJC Addendum.
3.

In Part C of his Statement of Facts, Mr. Pearson states that at the Appeals

Board hearing, "Assistant City Manager John Geilmann, stipulated that Mr. Pearson's
termination was without cause and that it was based entirely on Mr. Pearson's alleged atwill status." Pet'r Init. Br., p. 4. This ignores the context of Mr. Geilmann's testimony.
The sole issue before the Appeals Board was whether Mr. Pearson's position was at-will,
not whether there was cause to terminate him if his position was not at-will. See R. 53A53B (Tr., pp. 19-20). Accordingly, the parties agreed that any alleged "reasons" for
termination would not be raised in the hearing. See id. Based on that limitation on the
issues before the Appeals Board, Mr. Geilmann agreed to stipulate to the Appeals Board's
chairman's statement that "for the record," "he [Mr. Pearson] was a good employee and
never had any negative evaluations or something to that effect." R. 53B (Tr., p. 20).
4.

In Part D of his Statement of Facts, Mr. Pearson suggests that, based on the

Appeals Board's decision, the sole basis for its decision was a review of § 10-3-1105, and
not a review of "factual evidence presented at the hearing." See Pet'r Init. Br., p. 4. This
is incorrect, as reflected below in the City's marshaled evidence. Although interpretation
of a statute is a legal issue, if the statute is reasonably susceptible of two or more
meanings, it is ambiguous. See Utah Pub. Employees Ass 'n, 2006 UT 9,ffl[59-60, 131
P.3d 208. When ambiguity is found, a court looks at "legislative history and relevant

11

policy considerations." Id. f 59. Moreover, in situations of ambiguity, the court may
look at the facts provided by the parties, and apply those in order to make its decision. See
Wilson, 2002 UT 94, <H 13-19, 54 P.3d 1177.
As set forth in the City's marshaled evidence, infra, the Appeals Board clearly
concluded that Mr. Pearson was an at-will employee based on the factual evidence
presented at the hearing, including that he: (a) admitted he was second in command in the
police department; (b) admitted he was never told by the City that he was not at-will, and
also conceded that this was just his own understanding; (c) admitted his responsibilities
included taking the place of the police chief in situations where the chief was not
available. See City's Marshaled Evid., infra ff 6, 7, 11. The Appeals Board also heard
evidence that at the time Mr. Pearson was hired in 2002, all police officers and not just
higher-ups, were at-will pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105. Id., % 8. This is
significant, since Mr. Pearson claims that when he was hired, he was sure he was not atwill based on relevant law, although "some" people might be at-will. Id. In addition to
the foregoing, the Appeals Board received evidence as to: (a) other sections of the Utah
Code where "assistant police chief clearly is viewed as the second in command in a
police department, and (b) "South Jordan City Public Safety Department" letterhead
stationary which identifies Lindsay Shepherd as "Director" and Mr. Pearson as "Chief of
Police Operations" and which shows Mr. Pearson as second in command. Id., ff 21, 32.
The reality is that evidence at the hearing was so one-sided and overwhelming that the

12

only conclusion the Appeals Board could possibly have reached was that Mr. Pearson was
an at-will employee.
5.

In Part D of his Statement of Facts, Mr. Pearson contends the City's trial

court "Memorandum in Support of Summary Disposition of Appeal," "confirmed" that
the Appeals Board's decision was based only on interpretation of § 10-3-1105. See Pet'r
Init. Br., p. 4. This misinterprets that Memorandum, which was based only on lack of
subject matter jurisdiction over the "appeal" in the district court. See City's Mem. Supp.
Summ. Disp., included as Ex. F in Addendum to Pet'r Init. Br. The Memorandum does
not address the Appeals Board hearing or testimony therein. See id.
III.

SOUTH JORDAN'S STATEMENT OF FACTS AND MARSHALING OF
EVIDENCE.
The City submits the following Statement of Facts and marshaled evidence:
A.

APPEALS BOARD HEARING

1.

At the Appeals Board hearing held April 27, 2007, Mr. Pearson was

represented by a lawyer. See R. 36.
2.

At the hearing, Mr. Pearson had the opportunity to call any witnesses that

he wished, but he called only himself. R. 68.
3.

Mr. Pearson testified that he worked in the police department of Midvale

City from April 1980 to July 2002. R. 46. As of July 2002, his position with Midvale
City was Assistant Chief of Police. Id.

13

4.

Mr. Pearson testified that when employed by Mid vale City, he "had a

signed agreement that was very definitive that explained exactly what my position was.
When I took the Assistant Chief of Police job I had the permanent secured rank of
lieutenant. So had [Midvale] removed me from the assistant police job for any reason
other than misconduct, I would have gone back to the rank of lieutenant." R. 49-50.
5.

Mr. Pearson became employed by the City in July 2002. See R. 155.

6.

Mr. Pearson testified that "his understanding" that he was not an at-will

employee was based in part "on my understanding of the state law" and on "my
understanding of the way municipalities conduct business; that their department heads
serve at will." R. 51. He also testified that nothing in City policy specified an Assistant
Police Chief's employment status to be at-will:
And up until the time I left South Jordan City, there was nothing in City
policy that differentiated the position of Assistant Chief of Police as being
someone who is at-will and served at the pleasure of the city manager.
Id.
7.

Mr. Pearson testified that Shelly Chapman, of the City's HR Department,

never told him in words that his employment was not at-will. R. 115.
8.

In response to cross-examination by the City's John Geilmann, Mr. Pearson

admitted that he knew when he was hired in 2002 that all police officers in municipalities
were at-will under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 (2002):
Q:

Chief Pearson, you indicate you were hired by the City in 2002; is
that correct?
14

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

And were you aware, at the time of your hire, of the state statute that
dealt with public employees, particularly those who are employees of
a municipality?

A:

Absolutely was.

Q:

And do you recall in 2002 that statute allowed for the termination of
police officers?

A:

Yeah. I believe that it allowed for some of that activity. But the
caveat to that is just because there's a state statute, you have to have
consistent policies and procedures within the City that give general
rules and guidelines for those employees. You can't single out one
employee in a city and not others and have inconsistencies. South
Jordan's policies and procedures are what prevail in this matter, and
South Jordan's policies were silent on the issues.

Q:

We will make those as legal arguments in a few minutes. I just
wanted to make sure that you understood at the time you [were]
hired, that there was a certain statute in place that controlled
municipal employees, and particularly police officers.

A:

It said that it could be done.

Q:

That they could be released without—that they were at-will
employees?

A:

I'm not sure of the exact terminology. But it did allow for some
people to be at-will, yeah.

R. 58-59; see also Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 (2002), Ex. B in SJC Addendum.
9.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-1105 was amended effective May 3, 2004 to reflect

its present language. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 (history).
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10.

When discussing a period of time when he became the City's Acting Police

Chief, Mr. Pearson gave the basis for his belief that he was not at-will, as that he had
"made it clear" to Police Chief Lindsay Shepherd and City employee Gary Whatcott that
he did not want to "place myself in the position of being at-will" and that neither Mr.
Whatcott or Chief Shepherd said anything in response to this statement. R. 63-64.
11.

In the hearing, Mr. Pearson admitted that during the entire time he was

employed by the City, he was second in command in the police department. R. 64-65.
12.

Mr. Pearson testified that the title "deputy Chief of Police" was never "used

in the time I was there." R. 67.
13.

Mr. Pearson testified that if he had become Acting Chief of Police after the

new version of § 10-3-1105 went into effect in 2004, "clearly I would have been an atwill employee." R. 68.
14.

Mr. Pearson admitted that on December 10, 2004, he sent a letter to Police

Chief Lindsay Shepherd asking that he be "demoted to the position of Lieutenant." R. 60;
see also R. 166-67 (Letter from Pearson to Shepherd).
15.

In presenting the City's case to the Appeals Board, City Attorney Geilmann

first explained the meaning of at-will employment, and stated that another type of
employment is that the employee can only be terminated for cause. R. 69-70. Mr.
Pearson's attorney did not object to the explanation. See id.

16

16.

In presenting the City's case to the Appeals Board, City Attorney Geilmann

first gave the Appeals Board members copies of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 and § 10-31106, as well as copies of city ordinances "that deal with the duties of city department
directors and the establishment of management positions within the City.55 R. 71; see also
R. 141-46 (copies of Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-1105 & -06).
17.

Rick Horst is South Jordan's City Manager. Mr. Horst testified that at the

time Mr. Pearson was hired, the positions of Chief of Police and Public Safety Director
were in one person, i.e., Lindsay Shepherd. R. 74-75; see also R. 156-57 (Job
Description for Ass't Police Chief).
18.

Mr. Horst testified that during the time that Mr. Pearson was employed, he

viewed Mr. Pearson as second in command in the City's police department, and that as
Assistant Police Chief, Mr. Pearson represented the police department at meetings when
Police Chief Shepherd was unavailable. R. 76.
19.

Mr. Horst testified that the City's organizational charts show that, as

Assistant Police Chief, Mr. Pearson was second in command in the police department.
See R. 78-79; see also R. 158-60 (organizational charts for City's police department).
20.

Mr. Horst testified that in his mind, "deputy chief and "assistant chief are

the same thing, i.e., second in command. R. 79, 92.
21.

The letterhead stationary shown to the Appeals Board was that of the

"South Jordan City Public Safety Department," and identifies Lindsay Shepherd as
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"Director" and Mr. Pearson as "Chief of Police Operations," and shows Mr. Pearson as
second in command. R. 161 (Letterhead).
22.

Mr. Horst testified that Mr. Pearson's position in the police department as

second in command, as well as the duties and responsibilities of the City's assistant police
chief position, made it clear in Mr. Horst's mind that Mr. Pearson was an at-will
employee. R. 84; see also R. 156-57 (City's Job Description for Ass't Police Chief).
23.

Mr. Horst testified that it would not have mattered to him whether Mr.

Pearson's title had been "deputy police chief or "assistant police chief," because to him
they both mean second in command in the police department. R. 91.
24.

Paul Cunningham is South Jordan's Director of Asset Management, and has

responsibility for human resources, risk management, fleet and facilities. R. 94-95.
25.

Mr. Cunningham testified that Mr. Pearson approached him a couple of

days before his termination, and asked questions about positions in the police department
and whether they were at-will. Mr. Cunningham told Mr. Pearson that, as Assistant
Police Chief, he was an at-will employee:
Q:

Have you ever had a conversation with Chief Pearson with regard to
his position in the City?

A:

There's one specific conversation that I recall. There could have
been more, but I remember one specifically.

Q:

That has bearing on this case?
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Yes.
Approximately when was that?
It was within a couple of days of the termination date.
In front of it or behind it?
Before it.
Before it. Okay. And do you recall the substance of that
conversation.
Well, it started with an approach about a concern because he had
published a newsletter article about the at-will concept. Dan
represented to me that some of his lieutenants were concerned
whether or not they were at-will employees, and then we had quite a
long discussion. At some point it became clear that part of that
discussion was his own interest in what status he had as an
employee. And we had quite a detailed discussion and went through
a number of issues, including the title issue.
And what was that discussion about the title issue?
Well, the title issue, I think Dan framed it in terms of—he clearly
read the statute and we were talking about the statute said that uses
the term, I believe "Deputy Police Chief as opposed to "Assistant
Police Chief." And we had some discussion about whether that was
the same thing and whether or not the City would use that, and if
there was an argument as being the same thing; whether it was a
semantic difference or whether it was controlling.
And do you recall the conclusion of that discussion?
My judgment, my personal opinion is that they are the same thing.
It's a semantic difference and that he is the number two person. He
is the assistant of the Police Chief, or the deputy. It's the same thing.
As such, did you tell him what his actual relationship in the City
was?
19

A:

Yeah. It was clear that my opinion was that he is an at-will
employee.

Q:

Did you communicate that to him?

A:

Yes.

R. 96-97.
26.

Mr. Cunningham testified that he was the person who submitted to the State

the City's response to Mr. Pearson's claim for unemployment benefits, and that he
marked on that form that Mr. Pearson's employment was at-will. See R. 98; see also R.
164 (Unemployment App. Resp.).
27.

Mr. Cunningham testified that he marked "at-will" on the unemployment

claim form because he thinks Mr. Pearson was an at-will employee. R. 98.
28.

Mr. Cunningham testified that in November 2007, he prepared a list that

identified which City employees were at-will and which were not, and that the list was
"accepted by the City and signed by the City Manager." R. 99-100. He testified the list
was created "to make sure that I understood, as the Human Resources Manager, which
positions the City treated as falling under the statute." R. 100.
29.

Mr. Cunningham testified that Utah cities typically use "Assistant Police

Chief as the title for the number two person in the organization." R. 103.
30.

In response to questions from Appeals Board members, Mr. Cunningham

agreed that the "designations of 'deputy' and 'assistant' are synonymous and
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interchangeable," and that the title "deputy police chief is "very uncommon in the state
of Utah:
Q:

(Chairman Woltius) And is it your position then, that the designation
of "deputy" and "assistant" are synonymous and interchangeable?

A:

(Mr. Cunningham) I think in the case of Assistant Police Chief,
typically, I think the intent is clearly the same thing. The title
"Deputy Police Chief is very uncommon in the state of Utah. And
you look at the structure of what the apparent intent of the law is,
and it seems to fit that the deputy or the assistant is the number two
person, just like the number two person in the fire department is
given at-will status. So that's my opinion, that it's an at-will
position.

Q:

(Board Member Wall) I have another question. So your reason for
saying that you think "deputy" and "assistant" are interchangeable, is
that based on the City practice here and policies, or your perception
of how business is conducted generally in Utah?

A:

(Mr. Cunningham) I think it's both. Clearly in South Jordan, the fire
department has a Deputy Fire Chief who is the number two. And
then the Assistant Police Chief is the number two. And I wish the
legislature had more artfully drawn that statute, but I think clearly
that's what the intent was; that the number two person in the police
department is an at-will employee.

R. 104-05.
31.

In his closing argument, City Attorney Geilmann provided Appeals Board

members with a copy of a page from Black's Law Dictionary which defines "deputy" as
"a person appointed or delegated to act as a substitute for another, particularly for an
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official," and pointed out that Black's Law Dictionary does not contain a definition for
"assistant." R. 122; see also R. 169 (copy of page from Black's Law Dictionary).
32.

In his closing argument, City Attorney Geilmann provided Appeals Board

members with a copy of Utah Code Ann. § 77-23b-6 [Title 77 (criminal code)], and
pointed out that in that section, which deals with electronic surveillance, the term
"assistant police chief designates the second in command in a police department:
(Mr. Geilmann) By the way, Title 77 is dealing with one of the most protected
rights that citizens in this country have and that is the right to be free from
unlawful search. And so title 77 is dealing with search and warrants and
specifically is referring to, in this 23(b), is talking about obtaining warrants under
electronic surveillance concepts. And it is saying who can do those warrants?
Who can go do those warrants? And they refer to a supervisory official in the
Code. And then they define "supervisory officials," and it says, "The supervisory
official is a county sheriff or Chief Deputy Sheriff or Police Chief or Assistant
Police Chiefy That's it. Number one person, number two person. So there's no
question that the state and the criminal code treats an Assistant Police Chief as a
number two individual.
R. 122-24 (emphasis added); see also 171-72 (copy of Utah Code Ann. § 77-23b-6).
33.

City Attorney Geilmann also stated in his closing argument that in Utah

Code Ann. § 10-3-1105, both the "head of a municipal department" and the "deputy of a
head of a municipal department" are at-will, and Chief Shepherd was the "head of a
municipal department," and Mr. Pearson was his "deputy." R. 124.
34.

Mr. Pearson's attorney rested his case and declined to respond when he was

asked by the Appeals Board whether he would like to address City Attorney Geilmann's
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arguments as to Black's Law Dictionary, Title 77, and "deputy of the head of a municipal
department." R. 126.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should either dismiss Mr. Pearson's appeal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction or, should the Court determine it has subject matter jurisdiction, affirm the
Appeals Board's decision that as Assistant Police Chief, Mr. Pearson was an at-will
employee.
First, this Court should dismiss Mr. Pearson's appeal because he has failed to meet
his burden to establish the basis for subject matter jurisdiction. His argument that
jurisdiction is established under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 fails because there is
nothing in that section that authorizes an appeal to this Court from a municipality's
procedures. His argument that this "Court made a final determination that it has
jurisdiction to review [this] matter in the Order of June 18, 2008" is also without merit
because that Order says nothing about subject matter jurisdiction being established over
this appeal, and acknowledges implicitly only that transfer to the district court had not
been proper. Mr. Pearson's citation to Rule 4-08(4)(c) of the South Jordan City
Employee Policy as the basis for jurisdiction also fails because a municipality's
ordinances or procedures do not provide an independent basis for appellate jurisdiction.
Furthermore, this Court has no jurisdiction to review a decision not to do something, Le.,
the Appeals Board's decision not to review Mr. Pearson's discharge.
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Even if Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 and -1106 are examined, this Court has no
jurisdiction because § 10-3-1106 deals only with a determination as to an employee's
appeal of the propriety of the reasons for the employee's "discharge, suspension without
pay, or involuntary transfer." However, Mr. Pearson appealed the determination as to his
at-will status, and not the propriety of his termination or that he was not provided posttermination due process. Finally, there is no jurisdiction if the issue is whether Mr.
Pearson was removed from at-will status by an express or implied-in-fact employment
agreement, since § 10-3-1106 relates only to employees who are not at-will as determined
by a statute, i.e., § 10-3-1105. Section 10-3-1106 does not include municipal employees
who rely, not on a statute, but on express or implied-in-fact agreements to claim they are
not at-will.
Second, even if there were subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal, the Court
should affirm the Appeals Board's decision that Mr. Pearson was an at-will employee
based on his failure to marshal the evidence in his initial brief. If an appellant fails to
marshal evidence, an appellate court will not address a challenge to factual findings and
must assume they are correct. In this context, there is no merit to Mr. Pearson's
contention that this appeal involves only questions of law as to the interpretation of Utah
Code Ann. § 10-3-1105, since introduction and examination of extrinsic evidence is
proper when a statute is ambiguous. Section 10-3-1105 is ambiguous because Mr.
Pearson claims that "deputy police chief means exactly that title and nothing else, but the
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statute itself reflects that a "deputy" is the same as a second in command when it refers to
the exclusion of "a deputy of a municipal department." Related statutes and policy
concerns also reflect that the titles "assistant police chief and "deputy police chief are
interchangeable, inasmuch as South Jordan does not have a position titled "deputy" police
chief. Moreover, the application of a legal standard is fact-sensitive which means that the
appellant must marshal the evidence. All of the evidence before the Appeals Board
showed that the South Jordan "assistant" police chief was the second in command, which
Mr. Pearson admits. Finally, whether an express or implied-in-fact employment
agreement exists to alter an employee's at-will status, which is Mr. Pearson's alternative
argument, is also a question of fact which requires that the appellant/petitioner marshal
the evidence.
Third, aside from lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to marshal the
evidence, the Appeals Board should be affirmed in finding the position of assistant police
chief to be at-will under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105. As stated above, this statute is
ambiguous because the statute itself shows that "deputy" can be either a title, or the
second in command in a department. It is clear from extrinsic evidence that the "deputy"
police chief title in § 10-3-1105 simply means second in command in a police department.
Since South Jordan has no position titled "deputy police chief, " § 10-3-1105 applies to
the second in command "assistant" police chief position. Policy considerations also
dictate that the term "deputy police chief in Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 is the same as
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the second in command. The statute reflects that the legislature intended only to protect
the jobs of employees who are not in policy making positions, and who are not directly
involved in a meaningful and important way with the running of a department. A "police
chief and his or her second in command are not among these non-policy-making
positions.
Related statutory provisions also show that "deputy" and "assistant" titles in police
departments are interchangeable. In Utah's civil service commission statute, both
"deputy" and "assistant" police chiefs are at-will, and it is illogical for the titles of both
"deputy" and "assistant" police chief to be at-will under civil service rules, but not to be
at-will with regards to a second-in-command with the title of "assistant" police chief in a
city that has no "deputy" police chief. Similarly, in Utah's Criminal Code, the title
"assistant" police chief is used for the second in command in a police department.
Fourth, there is no merit to the argument that, even if Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105
& -06 did not apply, Mr. Pearson's at-will status was altered by an express or implied-infact agreement. In that situation, there is no subject matter jurisdiction under § 10-3-1106
because the due process procedures set forth in § 10-3-1106 apply only to employees
designated in § 10-3-1105. Regardless, there is no evidence to show either an express or
implied-in-fact agreement. Whether there is an implied-in-fact agreement is determined
by the objective manifestations of the parties' intent, and the evidence presented by the
employee must show a definite and clear acts by the employer such that they are a
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unilateral offer by the employer showing a specific intent to alter the at-will status. An
employee's "understanding" is insufficient to rise to the level of altering an at-will
employment position. Mr. Pearson failed to provide any such evidence at all in the
Appeals Board hearing, and the Appeals Board properly found his employment at-will.
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT LACKS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION.
The Court should dismiss Mr. Pearson's appeal of his grievance for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. As the person bringing this appeal, Mr. Pearson has the burden of
establishing subject matter jurisdiction exists. Thompson, 743 P.2d at 1232 n.2. He has
failed to do this.
First, although Mr. Pearson's brief asserts the basis for this Court's jurisdiction as
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103, there is nothing in that section that would allow a direct
appeal from a city's grievance procedure to the Court of Appeals.
Second, the only other basis for jurisdiction stated in Mr. Pearson's brief is that
this "Court made a final determination that it has jurisdiction to review [this] matter in the
Order of June 18, 2008." See Pet's Init. Br., p. 1. However, this Court's two June 18,
2008 Orders (R. 32, 34) say nothing about subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal, and
are more likely viewed as acknowledging the district court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(7), so that transfer to the district court had
not been proper.
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Third, in his Petition to this Court, Mr. Pearson cites Rule 4-08(4(c) of the South
Jordan City Employee Policy as the basis for jurisdiction. See R. 22-23. However, a
municipalities' ordinances or procedures cannot provide an independent basis for
appellate jurisdiction under the circumstances that exist here.
Fourth, this Court has no jurisdiction to review a decision not to do something, Le.9
a decision not to review Mr. Pearson's discharge. See Nielsen v. Division of Police
Officer Standards & Training, 851 P.2d 1201, 1204 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
In light of the foregoing, Mr. Pearson has failed to set forth and establish a basis
for this Court's jurisdiction over this appeal. "The fundamental and initial inquiry of a
court is always to determine its own jurisdictional authority over the subject matter of the
claims asserted. Upon a determination by the Court that its jurisdiction is lacking, the
authority extends no further than to dismiss the action." Thompson, 743 P.2d at 1232.
Moreover, even if Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 and -1106 are examined, this
Court has no appellate jurisdiction over this matter. Significantly, one of Mr. Pearson's
arguments in his brief is that, even if Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 did not apply to him so
that he was at-will under that statute, he was removed from statutory at-will status by an
express or implied-in-fact employment agreement. See Pet'r Init. Br., pp. 12-15. In
making that argument, Mr. Pearson concedes there is no subject matter jurisdiction over
this appeal, since § 10-3-1106 relates only to employees who are not at-will as determined
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by § 10-3-1105, which does not include municipal employees who contend they are not
at-will based on express or implied-in-fact agreements.
Aside from the fact that § 10-3-1106 does not cover a direct appeal from a
municipality's appeals board to the Court of Appeals regarding an express or implied-infact employment situation, and only deals with § 10-3-1105 employees, § 10-3-1106 also
deals only with a municipality's appeals board's determination as to an employee's appeal
of the propriety of the reasons for the employee's "discharge, suspension without pay, or
involuntary transfer." See Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(2)(a). When Mr. Pearson was
informed he was an at-will employee, he pursued his appeal to the Appeals Board as a
grievance of his status, not as a grievance of the propriety of his discharge. This Court has
no jurisdiction under § 10-3-1106 to review a grievance as to an employee's status. This
Court only has subject matter jurisdiction under § 10-3-1106 to review the actual
discharge, unpaid suspension, or involuntary transfer of an employee who is not at-will.
In sum, there is no subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal and Mr. Pearson has
failed to meet his burden to establish a viable basis for jurisdiction. Although there may
be other legal avenues for Mr. Pearson to pursue this issue, he instead has decided to
bring this appeal. This Court should not bend § 10-3-1106 to allow him to pursue the
issue here, and his appeal should be dismissed.
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II.

EVEN IF THERE WAS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION, MR.
PEARSON HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE.
Even if there were subject matter jurisdiction, the Court should affirm the Appeals

Board's decision that Mr. Pearson was an at-will employee because he failed to marshal
the evidence. It is well-settled that to challenge an appeals board's factual findings, an
appellant "must marshal all evidence supporting the factual findings and then show that
despite these facts, and in light of conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are
not supported by substantial evidence." Whitear v. Labor Comm'n, 973 P.2d 982, 984
(Utah Ct. App. 1998); see also Utah R.App.P. 24(a)(9). To marshal evidence, appellants
must "'"temporarily remove [their] own prejudices and fully embrace the adversary's
position"; they must play the "devil's advocate.'" Stichting, 2006 UT 35, f 26, 140 P.3d
1200 (citations omitted). If an appellant fails to marshal evidence in its initial brief, the
appellate court will not address a challenge to factual findings and must assume they are
correct. Whitear, 973 P.2d at 985; Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 312.
Presumably to avoid examination and marshaling of factual evidence submitted at
the Appeals Board hearing, Mr. Pearson contends this appeal involves only questions of
law regarding the interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105. Pet's Init. Br., p. 1.
However, where a statute is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence can be used to determine the
interpretation. Mr. Pearson implicitly acknowledges that § 10-3-1105 is ambiguous by
raising various arguments as to the meaning of "deputy." "'Even where [appellants]
purport to challenge only the legal ruling,... if a determination of a court's application of
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a legal standard is extremely fact-sensitive, the [appellants] have a duty to marshal the
evidence.'" Stichting, 2006 UT 33, f 25, 140 P.3d 1200 (quoting Chen v. Stewart, 2004
UT 82, f 20, 100 P.3d 1177); see also Traco, 2007 UT App 407, f 44, 175 P.3d 572. A
party "cannot dodge this duty by attempting to frame the issues as legal ones." Stichting,
2006 UT 33, f 25, 140 P.3d 1200.
Moreover, even though a '"Board's application or interpretation of a statute is a
question of law'" (Whitaker, 2008 UT App 282, f 10, 191 P.3d 814 (citation omitted)), if
there is ambiguity, a trial court must look at the facts provided by the parties, and apply
those in order to make its decision (see Wilson, 2002 UT 94, <M 13-19, 54 P.3d 1177).
First, § 10-3-1105 is ambiguous because "deputy" might be viewed as a specific
title, but also as second in command in a department, Le., "a deputy of a head of a
municipal department."
Second, Mr. Geilmann submitted to the Appeals Board a provision from the
criminal code that uses the title "assistant police chief for the second in command in a
police department. See City's Stmt. Facts, f 32.
Third, it is clear that additional facts were involved in the determination of
whether Mr. Pearson's position as assistant police chief was the same as a "deputy police
chief." These involved that: (1) a deputy and assistant are both the second in command;
(2) Mr. Pearson's job responsibilities were those of a second in command; (3) Mr.
Pearson believed he was second in command; (4) the City viewed Mr. Pearson as second
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in command; and (4) in December of 2004 Mr. Pearson asked to be demoted, which
would have taken him out of the at-will category and made him a lieutenant. See id., ffff
11-12, 14, 18-23,25,29-32.
Fourth, Mr. Pearson contends that even if he was an at-will employee under §103-1106, he was taken out of that at-will status based on an express or implied-in-fact
agreement with the City. That argument also requires marshaling of evidence. Whether
an implied-in-fact employment agreement exists to take an employee out of the at-will
category is a question of fact (Ryan, 972 P.2d at 401; Gilmore, 775 P.2d at 941), which
"turns on the objective manifestations of the parties' intent" (Johnson, 86 F. Supp. 2d at
1121). Whether Mr. Pearson had an express agreement with the City is also a question of
fact. See Hellstrom, 455 P.2d at 442. Issues relevant to whether there was an express
agreement, i.e., a contract, are whether: (1) there was a clear offer and acceptance; (2)
there were competent parties; (3) there was clear communication by the employer that it
intended to offer employment other than at-will; (4) the communication was sufficiently
definite to be a contract provision; (5) the intent was so specific that the employee "must
reasonably believe that the employment offered is other than at will." See Traco, 2007
UT App 407, f 38, 173 P.3d 572; Johnson, 86 F. Supp.2d at 1121 (citations omitted). All
of these factors involve factual issues.
In sum, Mr. Pearson failed to marshal the evidence. The Appeals Board's
determination that his employment was at-will should be summarily affirmed.
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III.

MR. PEARSON WAS AT-WILL UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-3-1105.
The Appeals Board should be affirmed in finding the position of South Jordan

Assistant Police Chief to be at-will under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105. Mr. Pearson
contends this is a question of law since it involves the interpretation of a statute, and that
the Appeals Board erroneously concluded that § 10-3-1106 does not apply to his position
as assistant police chief. See Pet'r Init. Br., pp. 6-11. This argument should be rejected.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 governs which members of a municipal police
department are at-will:
(1)
Except as provided in Subsection (2), each employee of a
municipality shall hold employment without limitation of time, being
subject to discharge, suspension of over two days without pay, or
involuntary transfer to a position with less remuneration only as provided in
Section 10-3-1106:
(2)

Subsection (1) does not apply to:
(a)
an officer appointed by the mayor or other person exercising
executive power in the municipality;
(b)
a member of the municipality's police department or fire
department in a first or second class city;3
(c)
a police chief of the municipality;
(d)
a deputy police chief of the municipality;
(e)
a fire chief of the municipality;
(f)
a deputy or assistant fire chief of the municipality;
(g)
a head of a municipal department;
(h)
a deputy of a head of a municipal department;
(i)
a superintendent;
(j)
a probationary employee of the municipality; or

3

As a city of the third class with a population of slightly more that 50,000, South
Jordan has no civil service. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-301 (classifications of
municipalities based on population).
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(k)

a seasonal employee of the municipality.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105(2). Mr. Pearson contends that even though his position as
assistant meant he was second in command in the City's police department, he is not an
at-will employee because his specific title was not "deputy police chief." Pet'r Init. Br.,
pp. 8-9.
This argument should be rejected because, aside from the "deputy police chief
phrase, Mr. Pearson clearly was "a deputy of a head of a municipal department."
Moreover, even focusing on the phrase "deputy police chief," Mr. Pearson's
position as "assistant police chief was at-will.
When construing a statute, courts "do '"not look beyond the plain language of
[the] provision'"" unless it '""find[s] some ambiguity in it.'"" Utah Pub. Employees,
2006 UT 9, f 59, 131 P.3d 208 (citations omitted). When ambiguity is found, a court
looks at "legislative history and relevant policy considerations." Id. "Like a contract, a
statute is ambiguous when it may reasonably 'be understood to have two or more
plausible meanings.'" Id. at% 60 (citations omitted). Moreover:
. . . determining whether there are two or more plausible meanings depends
not only on the text of the particular provision at issue, but also on the text
of the statute as a whole. Indeed, "[w]e 'read the plain language of the
statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other
statutes in the same chapter and related chapters.'" As a result, a statute
susceptible to competing interpretations may nevertheless be unambiguous
if the text of the act as a whole, in light of related statutory provisions,
makes all but one of those meanings plausible. When viewing the act as a
whole does not eliminate duplicative yet plausible meanings, the statute is
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ambiguous, and we may resort to extrinsic interpretive tools to resolve the
ambiguity.
Id. (internal citations omitted); Wilson, 2002 UT 94, <H 13-19, 54 P.3d 1177 (in cases of
ambiguity, court may look at facts provided by parties and apply those to make decision).
Under this standard, an "assistant" police chief in South Jordan is at-will.
First, § 10-3-1105 is ambiguous, since it can be viewed at least two ways, e.g., as
the exact title "deputy" police chief, or as the second in command in a police department.
Indeed, § 10-3-1105 reflects that "deputy" also means second in command when it
includes as a non-protected, "at-will" employee, the "deputy of a head of a municipal
department."
Second, policy considerations dictate that the term "deputy police chief in Utah
Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 is the same as the second-in-command. For example, in the same
provision, "deputy" is used to mean second in command in a "department." It is clear
from § 10-3-1105 that the legislature intends only to protect the jobs of employees who
are not in policy making positions, and who are not directly involved in a meaningful and
important way with the running of a department. A "police chief and his or her second
in command are not among these non-policy-making positions.
Third, an examination of related statutory provisions shows that the "deputy" and
"assistant" titles in police departments are interchangeable.4 See Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-

4

Civil service commissions can be created in cities of the first or second class. See
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1003(l)(a).
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1002(1). For example, under Utah's civil service commission statute, both "deputy" and
"assistant" police chiefs are at-will. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1002(1). It is illogical
for the titles of both "deputy" and "assistant" police chief to be at-will under civil service
rules, but not to be at-will with regards to a second-in-command with the title of
"assistant" police chief in a city like South Jordan that has no "deputy" police chief.
Indeed, in Ward v. Richfield City, 116 P.2d 93 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the court held that a
city employee claiming to be a "city marshal with appointed assistants," could not evade §
10-3-1105fs exclusion of "members of police department" from coverage, since other
sections of Title 10 use the terms "chief of police" and "city marshal" interchangeably.
Id. at 97 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-918).
Similarly, Utah's Criminal Code reflects that "assistant police chief is the second
in command. See City's Stmt. Facts \ 32. At the Appeals Board hearing, Mr. Geilmann
provided Board members with a copy of Utah Code Ann. § 77-23b-6, which deals with
electronic surveillance. That provision states:
(f) As used in this subsection, "supervisory official" means the investigative
agent in charge or assistant investigative agent in charge or an equivalent of
an investigative's headquarters or regional office; a county sheriff or chief
deputy sheriff, or police chief or assistant police chief the officer in charge
of an investigative task force or the assistant officer in charge; or the
attorney general, an assistant attorney general, a county attorney or district
attorney, a deputy county attorney or deputy district attorney, or the chief
prosecuting attorney of any political subdivision of the state.
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-23b-7(f) (emphasis added). City Attorney Geilmann pointed out to
Appeals Board members that in this section, the term "assistant police chief is used for
the second in command in a police department. See City's Stmt. Facts % 32.
In sum, all of the evidence shows that as assistant police chief, Mr. Pearson was
second in command in South Jordan's police department. The evidence made clear to the
Appeals Board that South Jordan's police department had no "deputy police chief title,
and that the City's "assistant police chief was the second in command. Thus, the title
"deputy police chief in § 10-3-1105 would include his position, and the Appeals Board
properly found Mr. Pearson's employment to be at-will.
IV.

THERE WAS NO EXPRESS OR IMPLIED-IN-FACT AGREEMENT THAT
WOULD ALTER MR. PEARSON'S AT-WILL STATUS.
The Court should reject Mr. Pearson's argument that, even if Utah Code Ann. §

10-3-1105 & -06 did not apply, his at-will status was altered by an express or implied-infact agreement. Preliminarily, as discussed above, if this is Mr. Pearson's argument, this
Court clearly has no subject matter jurisdiction under § 10-3-1106. Furthermore, there is
no evidence whatsoever of an express or implied-in-fact agreement that Mr. Pearson was
not an at-will employee.
The existence of an implied-in-fact agreement to alter an employment agreement
"turns on the objective manifestations of the parties' intent." Johnson v. Morton Thiokol,
818 P.2d 997, 1001 (Utah 1991). Evidence to establish an implied-in-fact employment
contract "must be sufficient to fulfill the requirements of a unilateral offer." Id. at 1002.
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This requires that "[t]he employee must communicate the intent to offer employment
other than at will, the communication must be sufficiently definite to act as a contract
provision, and the communicated intent must be such that the employee may reasonably
believe that the employment offered is other than at-will." Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah, Inc.,
844 P.2d 331, 334 (Utah 1992). An employee's "understanding" is insufficient to rise to
the level of altering an at-will employment position. Kirberg v. West One Bank, 872 P.2d
39, 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). To establish that employment is other than at-will, the
employee must point to "affirmative and definite acts [of the employer]'s intent to modify
its at-will contract." Id.
Mr. Pearson has failed to point to any affirmative and definite acts that would alter
his at-will status. He did not provide the Appeals Board with an express, written
agreement and, indeed, there is no such agreement. He also failed to provide evidence to
the Appeals Board to show that the City provided him with anything that was
"sufficiently definite" to act as a contract provision. In fact, Mr. Pearson's sole evidence
was his own "understanding" and expectations, the July 15, 2002 letter, and his argument
that he could not locate any City policies stating that he was at-will. This is insufficient
to rise to the level of being so definite as to become a "contract provision," and the
Appeals Board properly found that his employment was at-will.
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CONCLUSION
South Jordan City respectfully asks this Court to find that it has no subject matter
jurisdiction over this appeal. In the alternative, the City asks the Court to affirm the
Appeals Board's determination that petitioner Daniel Pearson was an at-will employee in
his position as South Jordan City's Assistant Police Chief. Since Mr. Pearson failed to
marshal the evidence, factual findings should be affirmed, particularly since the Appeals
Board's determination was proper in that all of the evidence presented at the hearing
pointed unequivocally to the fact that Mr. Pearson's position was at-will.

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Given the unusual posture of this case and the unusual issues raised, South Jordan
City requests oral argument to assist the Court in more fully understanding its position.
DATED this

of October, 2008.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

^j^Y
&rmlle N. Jc
Judith D. Wofaerts
Attorneys for South Jordan City
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

of October, 2008,1 caused two (2) true and

correct copies of the BRIEF OF SOUTH JORDAN CITY to be mailed by first class
United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following:

Gregory G. Skordas
Chad D. Noakes
SKORDAS, CASTON & HYDE
Attorneys for Petitioner
341 South Main Street, Ste 303
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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Statutes and Rules
1. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105
2. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106

B.

South Jordan Employee Appeals Board and South Jordan City Petition for
Interlocutory Appeal

C.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 (2002 Version)
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§ 10 i- I 1 <

ibrarian, assistants and employees and paid into the system, a percentage of
heir wage or salary equal to the percentage of the monthly wage or salary of
)lher employees of the municipality which is paid into the system. Also there
;hall be paid monthly into the system from the funds of the library a further
aim equal to the total amount deducted monthly from, the wage or salary of the
ibrarian, assistants and employees and paid into the retirement system.
(2) Where the election by the board of directors of any library for inclusion of
its librarian, assistants and employees within the system of any municipality is
subsequent to the establishment of the system, the inclusion may begin as of the
date of the establishment of the system or as of the date of the election as shall
be determined by the board of directors. If inclusion is as of the date of the
establishment of the system, there shall be paid into the system in addition to
the subsequent monthly wage deductions and matching sums, a sum equal to
the aggregate of monthly payroll deductions and matching sums that would
have accrued during the period beginning with the establishment of the system
and ending with the election had the librarian, assistants and t. mplmees been
included within the system from, its establishment.
Laws 1.977, c. 48, § 3.
I ibrary References
Municipal Corporations $»220(9).
Westlaw Key Number Search: 268k220(9).

C.J.S. Municipal Corporations •'-?§ 623, 626,
629 to 630, 649 to 660.

Notes of Decisions
Payment of pension I
ment but estimated amount necessary to make
required payments from city pension fund
1. Payment of pension
S ^ e x c e e d e f h ^ two months contribution,
Under statute providing that library employ- employee was eligible to participate in pension
ees may be included in pension retirement sys- Plan> b u t b u r d e n rested on library board to pay
tern provided funds necessary shall be derived pension requirements of library employees, and
from revenues raised for benefit of the library did not rest on city. Laws 1947, c. 19, and §§ 1,
fund, where city library employee met require- 3. Taft v. Glade, 1948, 114 Utah 435, 201 P.2d
ments as to age and service necessary for retire285. Municipal Corporations <3=> 213
§ 10—3—1105*

Munit'If.KlI »,l(ii||)i|niii i i« ,

It'Ill'tilP in •

I In i mi in ill in in

I' «i«in ii| | flpy

ment—Exceptions
(I.) Except as provided, in. Subsection (.2), each employee of a municipality
shall hold employment without limitation, of time, being subject to discharge,
suspension of over two days without pay, or involuntary transfer to a position
with less remuneration only as provided in Section 10-3-1106.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to;
(a) an officer appointed by the mayor or other person oi ood\ exercising
executive power in the municipality;
(b) a member of the municipality's police department or fire department
who is a member of the classified civil service in a first or second class city;
(c) a police chief of the municipality;
(d) a deputy police chief of the municipality;
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(e) a fire chief of the municipality*
(f) a deputy or assistant fire chi*f o f t h e municipality;
(g) a head of a municipal depaiH :me p t '
(h) a deputy of a head of a muni c i P^ department;(i) a superintendent;
(j) a probationary employee of t^ e municipality;
(k) a part-time employee of the municipality; or
(I) a seasonal employee of the municipality.
(3) Nothing in this'section or Sec* i o n 10-3-110$ may bk construed to
municipality's ability to define caus^ f o r a n employee termination or rec
in force.
Laws 1977, a 48, § 3; Laws 2004, c. 26^' §' *' eff- M a y 3> 2 0 0 4 Libra^ References
CiS

Municipal Corporations <®=>149(1), 217.6.
x
Westlaw^Key Number Searches: 2 6 8 k l 4 9 ^
268k217 6.
i

- Municipal Corporations §§ 3i
> 6 0 8 t o 6 I 1 > 615 > 6 1 8 t o 6 1 9 * -

604

3. Incumbents
A de facto incumbent of a public \
subject to removal at any time, and
complain of an act by which such <
abolished. McAllister v. Swan, 1897,
1, 50 P. 812. Officers And Public Emplc
67
Where the incumbent of a public oi
sumes to act after the office has been ab
he has no legal claim against thd mum
for services so performed. McAllister v
1897, 16 Utah 1, 50 P. 812. Municipal
r a t i o n s ^ 162 4

Abolishment of office
City marshals 8
De facto officers 5
Department heads 4
Due process 1
Incumbents 3
Reappointment 7,
Removal of employees
1. Due processr
Plaintiff, having been fired from his job a s
director of parks for city in Utah,, had no pf 0 P"
erty interest in his job warranting due pro^ e s s
protection under Utah law but did have lib^ 1 ^
interest, and due process remedy was an opJ?or~
tunity to refute the charge, his right being ^ n e
which arose because there was danger of i°
closure of the community, due to deroga*01^
reasons for being fired.
U S C A . C^. s t '
Amends. 1, 5, 14;' Fed.Rules Civ,Proc.R^ s
12(b)(6), 59, 59(e), ?8» U.S.C.A.; 42 U.S.£ A *
§ 1983; U.C.A.1953, 10-3-1105. Eames v °lt?
of Logan, Utah,' 1985, 762 F 2d 83. C o n s ^ "
tional Law <®=> 277(2) '

4. ' Department heads
Despite police chief's contention that
not member of "police department" per
city marshall with appointed assistants,
chief fell within meaning of statute ex
members of police department, fire depj
and heads of departments frorn statutor
vided discharge and dismissal proc
UCA1953/ 10-3-918, 10-3-1105, 10-1
U.C.A.1953, 10-3-911 (Repealed).; W
Richfield City, 1989, 776 P.2d 93, ce

2. Abolishment of office
Under 1 Comrx Laws Utah 1888, & 312, t h e
municipality of Salt Lake City had the rig*1* to
create the office of inspector of provisions; and
where a municipality has the power* to Crea^ a i 1
office, it has, in the absence of legislative r e "
straint, the right to abolish it. McAllister v :
Swan, 1897, 16 Utah 1, 50 P. 812. Muni^P a l
Corporations <§=> 126

Municipal Corporations <&» 182
5. De facto officers
Mere fact that city marshal's bond h
pired did not forfeit his right to the
where he was permitted to continue to ai
was therefore> a de facto officer at leas
entitled to compensation, especially sin
city authorities could at any time on notic
required a bond. Henriod v. Church, 19
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8, City marshals
Under statute providing for appointment of a
city marshal in third-class city, city marshal's
term cannot in any event last beyond the next
municipal election even though no successor be
-;ng a city marshal was rightfully hold-' appointed. Utah Code 1943, 15-6-29, 15-6-30,
ilt, -lllw office, the attempt by the mayor to
15-6-32. Taylor v. Gunderson, 1944, 107 Utah
it-move him without the concurrence of the 437, 154 P.2d 653. Municipal Corporations <©=»
council was wholly ineffectual, in view of Comp,
183(2)
Laws 1907, § 215, as amended by Laws Utah
Where, four of the five councilmen of" third191L c. 125, requiring the concurrence of the class city were present when motion was made
council. Henriod v. Church, 1918, 52 Utah to remove city marshal and vote was two for
S34, {72 V 701, Municipal Corporations • @=» and two against, and mayor pursuant to statute
cast a vote in favor of the removal, the mayor
1830'
laving voted "aye" it was not necessary for him
:o vote again or otherwise indicate his concur?. Reappointment
rence, and hence proper procedure was folIn the absence of prohibitive statute, a city lowed in removing the city marshal. Utah Code
marshal, having resigned on day preceding ef- 1943, 15-6-3, 15-6-20, 15-6-24, 15-6-32. Tayfective date of raise in salary, was eligible to lor v. Gunderson, 1944, 107 Utah 437, 154 P.2d
reappointment on the next day> especially in 653. Municipal Corporations <S» 183(3)
;^iew of Laws 1911, c. 125, and Sess. Laws
A city marshal of third-class city may be re1917, c. 44, amending Comp. Laws 1907, moved without cause in view of fact that Legis§ 225, prohibiting increase of salary during lature eliminated from statute the words exterm of city officer, so as to limit such section to pressly requiring cause for removal. Utah Code
elective officers. Henriod v. Church, 1918, 52 1943, 15-6-29, 15-6-30, 15-6-32. Taylor v.
Utah 134, 172 P. 701. Municipal Corporations Gunderson, 1944, 107 Utah 437, 154 P.2d 653.
Municipal Corporations ©» 183(3)
Corporations

o* 183(2)

-;;- ..u .:- 1106. Discharge, suspe *
uout pay;"or involuntary'transferAppeals—Board—Procedure
; ) \n employee to which Section 10-3-1105 applies may not be discharged,
suspended without pay, or involuntarily transferred to a position with less
remuneration: •
(a) because of the- employee's polities or religious belief; or •
(b)' incident to, or through'changes, either-in the elective officers, governing body, or heads of departments.
(2)(a) If an employee is discharged/suspended for more than twb days
without pay, or involuntarily transferred from one position to another with less
remuneration for any reason, the employee may, subject to Subsection (2)(b),
appeal the discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer to a
board to be known as the appeal board, established under Subsection (7).
\h) If the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee shall exhaust the employee's rights unda that grievance :»rotcdinebefore appealing to the board.
(3)(a) Each appeal'under Subsectiw,, v^> oiiuu wt uajveii
• ten
notice of the appeal with the municipal recorder within ten da\
(i) if the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, ihe
employee receives notice of the !;»ia! disposiiiivi of the municipality's
internal grievance procedure; or
(ii) if the municipality, does not provide -an internal grievance procedure,
the discharge, 'suspension* or involuntary transfer.
581

MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT
denee that was only relevant to equal protection
and disparate treatment claims against the city
that had been dismissed on summary judgment,
and did not exclude evidence relating to employee's due process claim against supervisor, the
claim being heard by the jury. Allan v. Spnngville
City, 2004, 388 F 3d 1331. Federal Civil Procedure <£=> 2011
10. Termination
Allegations by former county employee that he
reported county employer's alleged violations of

§ 10-3-1106
the False Claims Act (FCA) to representatives of
the state and federal government, and that he was
retaliated against for making such reports, stated
claim for FCA retaliation, even without specific
allegations that reports were made directly ta
county employer, and without showing of county's
FCA violation U S. ex rel. Erickson v Uintah
Special Services Dist, 2005, 395 F Supp 2d 1088
Counties <&=> 67

O c ^ p p ' e hoersi" C3D

§ 10-3-1106. Discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer—
Appeals—Board—Procedure
(1) An employee to which Section 10-3-1105 applies may not be discharged, suspended
without pay, or involuntarily transferred to a position with less remuneration:
(a) because of the employee's politics or religious belief; or
(b) incident to, or through changes, either in the elective officers, governing body, or
heads of departments.
(2)(a) If an employee is discharged, suspended for more than two days without pay, or
involuntarily transferred from one position to another with less remuneration for any reason,
the employee may, subject to Subsection (2)(b), appeal the discharge, suspension without pay,
or involuntary transfer to a board to be known as the appeal board, established under
Subsection (7).
(b) If the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee shall
exhaust the employee's rights under that grievance procedure before appealing to the
board.
<3)(a) Each appeal under Subsection (2) shall be taken byfilingwritten notice of the appeal
with the municipal recorder within ten days after:
(i) if the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee receives
notice of the final disposition of the municipality's internal grievance procedure; or
(u) if the municipality does not provide an internal grievance procedure, the discharge,
suspension, or involuntary transfer.
(b)(i) Upon the filing of an appeal under Subsection (3)(a), the municipal recorder shall
forthwith refer a copy of the appeal to the appeal board.
(n) Upon receipt of the referral from the municipal recorder, the appeal board shall
forthwith commence its investigation, take and receive evidence, and fully hear and
determine the matter which relates to the cause for the discharge, suspension, or
transfer.
(4) An employee who is the subject of the discharge, suspension, or transfer may:
(a) appear in person and be represented by counsel;
(b) have a public hearing;
(c) confront the witness whose testimony is to be considered; and
(d) examine the evidence to be considered by the appeal board.
(5)(a)(i) Each decision of the appeal board shall be by secret ballot, and shall be certified to
the recorder within 15 days from the date the matter is referred to it, except as provided in
Subsection (5)(a)(n).
(u) For good cause, the board may extend the 15-day period under Subsection (5)(a)(i)
to a maximum of 60 days, if the employee and municipality both consent,
(b) If it finds in favor of the employee, the board shall provide that the employee shall
receive:
(l) the employee's salary for the period of time during which the employee is
discharged or suspended without pay; or
(li) any deficiency in salary for the period during which the employee was transferred
to a position of less remuneration.
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(6)(a) A final action or order of the appeal board may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals
'by filing with that court a petition for review.
(b) Each petition under Subsection (6)(a) shall be filed within 30 days after the issuance
of the final action or order of the appeal board.
(c) The Court of Appeals' review shall be on the record of the appeal board and for the
purpose of determining if the appeal board abused its discretion or exceeded its authority.
(7)(a) The method and manner of choosing the members of the appeal board, the number of
members, the designation of their terms of office, and the procedure for conducting an appeal
and the standard of review shall be prescribed by the governing body of each municipality by
ordinance.
(b) For a municipality operating under a form of government other than a council-mayor
form under Chapter 3b, Part 2, Council-Mayor Form of Municipal Government, an
ordinance adopted under Subsection (7)(a) may provide that the governing body of the
municipality shall serve as the appeal board.
Laws 1977, c. 48, § 3; Laws 2004, c. 260, § 2, eff. May 3, 2004; Laws 2008, c. 19, § 11, eff. May 5, 2008;
Laws 2008, c. 115, § 1, eff. May 5, 2008.
Historical and Statutory Notes
Composite section by the Office of Legislative
Research and General Counsel of Laws 2008, c. 19,
§ 11 and Laws 2008, c. 115, § 1.
Notes of Decisions
District court's actions of sustaining an objection
to line of questioning concerning supervisor's testimony relating to unpaid leave taken by other
2 Fvidence
employees was not an abuse of discretion, for
J
•' '
.
, ,
,
,
purposes of action brought by female employee
Letter from employees doctor to employees alleging wrongful termination and due process vioattorney, discussing employee's health problems l a t i o n s s t e m m m g from h e r termination of employassociated with her pregnancy and the stress_ of m e n t u p o n t a k i n g ma ternity leave, given that the
losing her job, was properly excluded m action ques tioning took place during redirect examination
brought by female employee alleging wrongful ter- ^ t h e ques tion was beyond the scope of redirect,
mination and due process violations stemming Mm v> Springville City, 2004, 388 F.3d 1331.
from her termination of employment upon taking Federal Civil Procedure <s=> 2015
maternity leave; although the letter contained a
Digtrict eourt,s
t of m o t k ) n in l i m i n e e x d u d .
mix of admissible and inadmissible evidence the m e v i d e n c e r e J a t f t o ^
^ ^
t i c e of
district, court allowed thejadmissib^ evidence to be J ^
for purposes <£ employee's claim
x
presented to the jury through the doctorsj trial
^
^ ^ a l l e ^ ^ £ r o c e s s vio_
fQrmep s
E idence 2

y
^JSSf* i ^ r V " £ P ? ^
'
'
F.3dl331. Evidence e» 357
Former employee failed to preserve for appellate review claim that district court erred in ruling
a letter from 'her previous counsel was inadmissible, for purposes of employee's claim against former employer alleging due process violations stemming from her termination of employment upon
taking maternity leave; when district court addressed the proposed exhibit, employee's current
counsel stated that he did not intend to use the
exhibit. Allan v. Springville City, 2004, 388 F.3d
1331. Federal Courts <s» 628
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lations stemmmg from her ter^mnation of employment upon taking maternity, leave, was not an
abuse of discretion, given that the order precluded
only the presentation of evidence as it related to a
city-wide practice of granting unpaid leave, evidence that was only relevant to equal protection
and disparate treatment claims against the city
that had been dismissed on summary judgment,
and did not exclude evidence relating to employee's due process claim against supervisor, the
claim being heard by the jury. Allan v. Springville
City, 2004, 388 F.3d 1331. Federal Civil Procedure <s=> 2011

E x e m p t i o n f r o m s t a t e l i c e n s u r e by Division of R e a l E s t a t e

In accordance with Section 61-2-3, an employee of a municipality is exempt from licensure
under Title 61, Chapter 2, Division of Real Estate:
(1) when engaging in an act on behalf of the municipality - «• • •? <ut..<. >- (a) this title; or
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that would have accrued during the period beginning with the establishment
of the system and ending with the election had the librarian, assistants and
employees been included within the system from its establishment.
H i s t o r y ; C. 1953 10-3-1104, e n a c t e d b y L.
1977, c h . 48, § 3.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Prerequisites.
Before library employees were eligible to participate in city plan under prior law, the library
board h a d to take proper action consisting of at
least two separate and distinct acts: (1) Pass

necessary resolutions permitting employees to
participate; and (2) provide funds necessary for
cost of participation. Taft v. Glade, 114 Utah
435, 201 P.2d 285 (1948).

QKOOO*

Vt 1 >; i

1

10-3-1105. Appointive officers arid employees -— DunM <
and t e r m i n a t i o n of t e r m of office.
All appointive officers and employees of municipalities, other than members
the police departments, fire departments, heads of departments, and
superintendents, shall hold their employment without limitation of time, bein r
subject to discharge or dismissal only as hereinafter provided.
0f

History: C. 1953, lO-.'M 111!1;., -n
1977, c h . 48, § 3.

I, iI I

L.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
no ^ accessor be appointed. Taylor v. Gunderson,
107 I'i.-ih 137, 154 P.2d 653 (1944).

Removal.
—Council to concur.
—Right to appeal.
—Who holds power.
—Without cause.
Construction.
The language "as hereinafter provided" in
this section specifically refers to the sections
t h a t follow. Therefore, "any officer" in § 10-31106 must mean any officer not excluded in this
section. Ward v. Richfield City, 776 R2d 93
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), aff'd, 798 P.2d 757 (Utah
1990).
f r -on in possession of a city office
^ CIL iiiost only a de facto officer, he is subject to
removal at any time and is not in a position to
complain of the city council's action abolishing
office. McAllister v. Swan, 16 U t a h 1, 50 P. 812
> i«97'.
'. n oi t e r m .
jrshal's term will not in any event last
>\ • -.f: 10 next municipal election even though

The consent of a :. .-—^y of the council is
necessary for removal
ificer. State ex rel.
Breeden v. Sheet?, 26 I-tah 105, 72 P. 334
(1903).
Assuming t h a t the city marshal was rightfully holding office, the attempt by the mayor to
remove him without the concurrence of the
council was wholly ineffectual. Henriod v.
Church, 52 Utah 134, 172 P. 701 (1918).
—Right to appeal.
The legislature intended specifically to exclude a chief of police, and hence "head" of a
police "department," from the appeal provisions
of § 10-3-1106. Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d
757 (Utah 1990).
—Who h o l d s p o w e r .
When this section is read in connection with
former § 10-6-30 (see present § 10-3-916), it
will be seen t h a t the same authorities who have
the power of appointment, the mayor and city
council, have the power of removal. Taylor v.
Gunderson, 107 Utah 437, 154 P.2d 653 (1944).
—Without c a u s e .
It is the legislative intent that a city marshal

10-3-1106
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in cities of the third class may be removed
without cause Taylor v Gunderson, 107 Utah
437, 154 P 2d 653 (1944)
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 56 Am Jur 2d Municipal
Corporations, Etc § 255
C. J.S. — 62 C J S Municipal Corporations
§§ 496 to 501, 552, 719
A.L.R. — Pre-employment conduct as ground

for discharge of civil service employee having
permanent status, 4 A L R 3d 488
Determination as to good faith m abolition of
public service or employment subject to civil
service or merit system, 87 A L R 3d 1165.

10-3-1106. Discharge or transfer — Appeals — Board —
Procedure.
(1) No officer or employee covered by Section 10-3-1105 shall be discharged
or transferred to a position with less remuneration because of his politics or
religious belief, or incident to, or through changes, either in the elective
officers, governing body, or heads of departments. In all cases where any officer
or employee is discharged or transferred from one position to another for any
reason, he shall have the right to appeal the discharge or transfer to a board
to be known as the appeal board which shall consist of five members, three of
whom shall be chosen by and from the appointive officers and employees, and
two of whom shall be members of the governing body.
(2) The appeal shall be taken by filing written notice of the appeal with th&
recorder within ten days after the discharge or transfer. Upon the filing of the
appeal, the city recorder shall forthwith refer a copy of the same to the appeal
board. Upon receipt of the referral from the municipal recorder, the appeal
board shall forthwith commence its investigation, take and receive evidence
and fully hear and determine the matter which relates to the cause for the
discharge or transfer.
(3) The employee shall be entitled to appear in person and to be represented
by counsel, to have a public hearing, to confront the witness whose testimony
is to be considered, and to examine the evidence to be considered by the appeal
board.
(4) In the event the appeal board upholds the discharge or transfer, the
officer or employee may have 14 days thereafter to appeal to the governing
body whose decision shall be final. In the event the appeal board does not
uphold the discharge or transfer the case shall be closed and no further
proceedings shall be had.
(5) The decision of the appeal board shall be by secret ballot, and shall be
certified to the recorder with 15 days from the date the matter is referred to it.
The board may, in its decision, provide that an employee shall receive his
salary for the period of time during which he is discharged, or any deficiency^
in salSry for the period he was transferred to a position of less remuneration"
but not to exceed a 15 day period. In no case shall the appointive officer or
employee be discharged or transferred, where an appeal is taken, except upon
a concurrence of at least a majority of the membership of the governing body
of the municipality.
(6) In the event that the appeal board does not uphold the discharge, or
transfer, the recorder shall certify the decision to the employee affected, and
also to the head of the department from whose order the appeal was taken. The
employee shall be paid his salary, commencing with the next working day
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